danger, however, is that the State, become more and more imbued with the secularist concept of man, may strive to put into practice the extreme views of eugenics, by a thoroughgoing scientific breeding of its citizens, in which neither sex nor love will have a part. This is the tendency of our times.

In brief, the book is a warmly human examination by an erudite theologian and philosopher written within the framework of Catholic Christian orthodoxy on a crucial point of modern living. R.F.C.


This small book contains three essays on the philosophy of mathematics, successively entitled: Philosophy and Mathematics,” “Philosophical Problems of Mathematics,” and “The Human Aspect of Mathematics.” Of these the longest and most important is the second, where the author seeks answers to three questions that will be of primary moment in orienting any philosophy of mathematics. The questions respect the type of being possessed by mathematical entities, the meaning of mathematical existence, and the ultimate reason for the applicability of mathematics to concrete reality.

From the answers to these questions and from the treatment of the general relationships between philosophy and mathematics, it is difficult to identify the particular philosophical option of the author. His placing of these problems as metaphysical ones puts him somewhat in the Aristotelian tradition, and indeed much of what he says throughout the book could be taken as consistent with modern Thomism. Some of his ideas, however, are Kantian; others explicitly break with that philosophy and lean towards the formalism of logical positivism. The safest conclusion to draw is that von Freytag-Löringhoff is an eclectic, taking part of his systematic presentation from traditional philosophy, the remainder from developments in modern mathematics.

In brief, the conclusions deducible from these essays may be summarized as follows. Mathematics is nothing more than “the total aggregate of logically possible systems which are based on implicit definition” (p. 33). The being of the objects of mathematics is fictitious, as opposed to that of concrete reality (pp.
Mathematical existence is therefore equivalent to membership in a particular system of objects and logical relationships (p. 30). Finally, mathematics can be applied to nature because there is an unequivocality existing in equal measure in both concrete reality and mathematics, which is reducible to this: they are both subject to the principles of logic (p. 55).

The most glaring defect in the author’s reasoning, from a Thomistic point of view, is his complete neglect of abstraction in contrasting mathematics, metaphysics and natural philosophy. He also gives no consideration to such primitive concepts of mathematics as number and Euclidean geometry, but plunges immediately into the abstract problems of modern mathematics. There is no denying the difficulty inherent in the problems he discusses, particularly in relation to modern thinking on the foundations of mathematics, but it seems that some of this difficulty could be lessened with an approach to the less known through the more known. For instance, an understanding of real numbers in terms of the second degree of abstraction from concrete reality would show that mathematics is not concerned exclusively with fictitious entities and, further, that logicism is not the ultimate answer to all philosophical questions about mathematics.

The translation of Countess von Zeppelin is technically accurate, but there is excessive capitalization of terms like Reality, Number, Concept, Whole, etc. And there are occasional sentences such as: “As a model of the type of Being which is attributed to mathematical objects, the Being of (concrete) Reality (Wirklichkeitsein) possesses real and not fictitious Subsistence-in-itself (Ansichbestand) as its essential ontological attribute, or ontological essence” (p. 53). Needless to say, they detract from the readability.


Leon Bloy is a man whom only God can judge, because he is a man of strange contradictions which defy human appraisal. Emmanuela Polimeni, in her life of the Pauper Prophet, is content to present the essential facts and character traits of Bloy, while leaving the final judgment to the reader. Her’s is the proper, though not too frequent, approach to the enigmatical Bloy. He is usually treated with uncontrolled enthusiasm or un-