tology,” an account of what God has had in mind for man from the very beginning, his project that will only be realized completely in the end-time (eschatology). What is described in the concrete imagery of Eden is this project or promise or plan (and this may never have been realized historically).

What is further described is the rejection of this project from the very outset by ha’adam, the man. But “the man” is not simply universalized mankind nor Everyman. Adam is both historical figure and “corporate personality.” He represents the solidarity-in-sin of all mankind, the way Moab represents the solidarity-in-sin of all Moabites and the way Christ represents the solidarity-in-grace of all Christians. As the notion of corporate personality was lost in the Greco-Roman world, original sin had to be expressed in terms of “human nature” which each individual receives from the first of the species, Adam. But something else is lost in the transition, viz., by personal sins the individual expresses his solidarity-in-sin and perpetuates the sinful environment, into which the next generation is born. Not only has Adam’s sin brought death and suffering into the world, our sins perpetuate it. In this Biblical mentality, therefore, the doctrine of original sin does not excuse us because of an inherited weakness or evolutionary immaturity but rather emphasizes our responsibility for the presence of evil in the world. This is Trooster’s conclusion.

Trooster’s opinions will naturally be of interest to the professional theologian. But of even greater value for the general reader is Trooster’s synthesis of current European scholarship on original sin. He makes use of Renckens on the first chapters of Genesis, Dubarle on the Biblical notion of original sin, Lyonnet on the exegesis of Rom. 5:12 ff. He includes Jeremias’ historical researches on infant baptism in the early Church and Schoonenberg’s exegesis of the decrees of Trent. His source material alone commends this short book to anyone wishing to keep abreast of current theology.

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Tillich can be considered either as a philosopher or as a theologian. Though Rowe prefers to approach his topic largely from a philosophical viewpoint, he begins by analyzing at length the main features of Tillich’s attempt to develop a Christian theology for our time as an effort both to precisely state the content of the Christian message and to make it relevant in man’s contemporary situation. Tillich’s claims against funda-
mentalism, liberalism, and Barth’s neo-orthodoxy are very well exposed in the introduction. Moreover, through the whole book the theological aspects of Tillich’s doctrine are taken into account as well as its philosophical insights.

The method followed by the author is a critical and detailed analysis of the most important statements concerning religious symbols and the notion of God as they appear against the background of his system as a whole, trying, therefore, to interpret Tillich’s affirmations with the help of other statements made by him. Sometimes such a procedure proves boring for the reader who expects a more lively exposition. But the advantages of the careful clarification of the statements are enough to justify such a method.

The author considers necessary, first of all, to answer the questions that arise from the definition of God as “ultimate concern”. Since men can become ultimately concerned with every imaginable thing, in which way can we affirm that God is man’s “ultimate concern”? Neither the reference to being-itself, which constitutes the second formal criterion of Tillich’s theology, does suffice in order to clarify the first one, but a distinction between psychological and the ontological meanings of the notion of “ultimate concern” provides the basic solution.

Two models are used then to interpret “beings-itself”; the traditional concept of the universal and Plotinus’ concept of the One. Though the use of the first model is somehow confusing, the whole approach in the second chapter is particularly interesting.

A discussion about Tillich’s doctrine on the existence of God is perhaps the best part of the book. Since Tillich views God as being-itself and existence as an attribute of the particular beings, he accordingly denies that God exists. However, as Rowe points out, when such an affirmation is compared with the system as a whole, we find some inconsistencies which could suggest at least the need for a revision of this strange doctrine. Both here and in the already mentioned discussion on the notion of being-itself interpreted after the model of the universal, one feels the temptation to ask what is the difference between pantheism and Tillich’s concept of God as being-itself.

From chapter IV on the topics are more closely related to the title of the work. A discussion on Tillich’s distinction between signs and symbols clarifies the extent and validity of their differentiating characteristics. The discussion concentrates especially on the notion of participation involved in the concept of symbol, since this is of paramount importance as far as the nature of the religious symbols is concerned. A detailed account of the meaning of subjective and objective, both on an ontological level and from a phenomenological viewpoint tries to clarify Otto’s description of religious experience as an awareness of a numinous object as objective and outside of the self-description accepted by Tillich.

The difference between religious symbols and myths derives as a
conclusion from an accurate description of the former. As for the mythical and historical aspects of our knowledge of Jesus Christ, Rowe succeeds in pointing out the difficulties brought up by Tillich’s claim that faith does not provide any historical certainty about Jesus’ life. Tillich maintains that the only way to knowledge of the factual truths of the past is historical research, which, on the other hand, cannot lead to certainty, but only to probability. The result of Tillich’s emphasis on the distinction and independence of faith regarding history is rather the impossibility to know who Jesus Christ actually was.

Is the God of the Christians also a symbol? If so, whom it points to? In answering these questions, Rowe expatiates on the different meanings that Tillich finds in the term “God” as we use it. Since all statements concerning God are symbolic, one has to face the temptation of adopting a mythical interpretation of them, even of Jesus Christ who is also a symbol for Tillich. Everywhere though in different ways the same question arises: since our knowledge of God is symbolic to such an extent, do we really know anything at all about God? Furthermore, since the symbol is supposed to deny itself because it has to point to what it symbolizes in such a way that, if this does not happen, then it becomes idolatrous, how does one avoid man’s tendency to create idols? The way in which all religions can become and actually become idolatrous is the matter of the last chapter.

The reader could miss, as he goes through this book, what Tillich himself calls “semantic rationality” in the introduction to his Systematic Theology. But, as Tillich also points out such a careful concern for the meanings and nuances of words, which was a characteristic of Scholastic Theology, is unfortunately missing everywhere in contemporary theological literature.

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Sometimes the only way of approaching problems that have attracted centuries of arguments is to take a new and different look at them. But the insight needed to accomplish this is never too common. However, just such a solution for the problem of the inerrancy of Scripture may well be contained in this small, though scholarly book. Should we not, the author asks, talk about the truth which the Bible teaches rather than about its freedom from error? Concerning the latter notion, exegetes in the Augustinian-scholastic tradition had, in some cases, strained to make the facts fit the theory. And it must be admitted that Scriptural inerrancy